This paper analyzes principles of human conversation based on the conversational goals of the participants.
These rules, as well as other aspects of the conversation process, are embodied in MICS, a computer program that generates one side of a conversation.
The process model underlying MICS, and some illustrative output, are presented.
I) Formulating rules about human conversations.
This paper is an empirical approach to understanding the processes that underlie human conversations.
Since the task of codifying all the knowledge required for modeling human discourse is monumental, we confine our approach to formulating rules about the conversational intent of utterances in the course of a dialog. This approach leads us to investigate the effects of shared assumptions and knowledge between the speakers, the social and interpersonal relations of the speakers, and the inferences that must be made by both speakers in a conversation.
We take a different approach to analyzing conversations than other research efforts, such as those adopting the speech-acts paradigm (Mann et al [1977] ) or investigating task-specific dialogs (Grosz [1977] )o in the hope that our new perspective will shed some light on otherwise obscure or neglected aspects of human discourse.
Consider the following conversation fragment between
Bill and John, two college students sharing an apartment: "There are a few more microns of dust on the windowsill than the last time you asked me that question." This is indeed "something new", but we would think of Bill as a wise guy for answering the question literally rather than addressing what John "must have meant".
What did John really mean? John must have been looking for something out of the ordinary and of some intrinsic importance.
Let us propose a new rule to incorporate this principle: RULE 2: In the formulation of an answer, the speaker should address the true significance of the question, not just its literal meaning.
What is the true significance of a question? In Conversation Fragment (I), Bill might have answered: "The J-particle angular momentum of +3/2 was confirmed today." John, a literature major who does not understand Physics, may not be inclined to continue the conversation.
Therefore, Bill's answer is not what was called for, unless Bill intentionally wanted to end the conversation. This example suggests that Bill missed something in establishing the true significance of John's question.
John did, indeed, explicitly ask to hear something new; implicitly he meant something important and out of the ordinary.
The J-particle answer conforms to these requirements, but it is still an inappropriate response.
Therefore, the true significance of John's answer must include John's conversational goal. Why did John ask "What's new"?
The answer is, obviously, to start a conversation with Bill. Bill, being aware of this conversational goal, needs to choose an answer that attempts to initiate conversation. That is, Bill should choose a topic of conversation that John can talk about and that John may be interested in. Conversational Rule (3) summarizes this discussion: RULE 3: In introducing a new topic of conversation, the topic should be chosen so that both speakers have some knowledge and interest in its discussion.
The process of understanding the conversational import of an utterance may be conceptually divided into two primary subprocesses: I) determine the conversational goal of the utterance, and 2) establish the real, often implicit, meaning of the utterance.
Lehnert [1977] analyzes the process of establishing the real meaning of questions. Our analysis focuses on the conversational goals of the participants and the establishment of a shared knowledge base between the participants.
It is this shared cultural, personal, and factual knowledge that the conversational participants leave implicit in each commtmication.
To illustrate this fact, consider Conversational Fragment (2):
2) JOHN: Do you want to go out and try the bar at Monument Square? BILL: I'm going to visit my folks tonight.
Real significance of Bill's utterance: i) No, I do not want to go to the M~nument Square bar. ii) My reason for not wanting to go is that I made a previous commitment, and I cannot be in two places at once tonight.
ill) The previous commitment is a visit to my folks. iv) I am telling you about the reason why I cannot go drinking with you rather than just saying "no" because I do not want you to get angry at me. v) I may also wish to shift the topic of conversation to a discussion about my fam il y.
Bill knows that John will interpret his answer so as to conclude its real significance; otherwise Bill would have chosen to explicitly state the real significance. How does Bill know that John will understand him correctly? Clearly Bill and John must share some common sense knowledge such as: a) A person cannot be in two places at once. b) Previous commitments should be honored. c) If X's invitation or suggestion is turned down by Y without apparent reason, then X is likely to get upset at Y. d) If a person introduces a new topic in a conversation, he may want to discuss the current topic further, Both Bill and John are aware that they share a common cultural knowledge base. This knowledge is very crucial in determining what is said in the conversation.
Bill must have considered (1) through (iv) before deciding that is was sufficient to say only (ill). How did Bill decide to say only (ill)?
He must have concluded that John would infer (i) , (ii) and (iv) without difficulty.
Thus, Bill knew about John's general knowledge because of their common cultural background and their personal relation.
Bill used this knowledge to decide what to say in the c onv er satlon.
In the course of a conversation, people make assumptions about each other's knowledge. It is sometimes easier to see what these conversational assumptions are when they turn out to be incorrect, as in the following example:
3) PETE:
How are you going to vote on Proposition 13?
MARY:
On what?
PETE:
You know, the property tax limitation.
MARY:
Oh yeah. I'm not registered to vote. Which way were you trying to convince me to vote? PETE: I was hoping you would help me make up my mind.
Actually, I don't give a damn about politics.
At the beginning of the conversation Pete ass~ed that Mary knew what Proposition 13 was, that she was able to vote, that she would vote, and that she had already decided how to vote on Proposition 13. All of these assumptions turned out to be incorrect, and the course of the conversation turned towards clarifying the incorrect ass~ptions. This example is an instance of a more general rule of conversation: RULE 4: If a participant in a conversation discovers that his assumptions about the shared knowlege between the two speakers is incorrect, then he will steer the conversation to I) establish a common knowledge base on a specific topic, or 2) discover what their shared knowledge is in general, or 3) shift the conversational topic to some matter where a common knowledge base is more likely to exist, or 4) end the conversation. 
4) SON:
Dad, I robbed the liquor store yesterday.
DAD:
How could you ever do such a thing, son?
SON:
Well, I got me this gun, and I pointed it at the cashier...
To illustrate the importance of the implicit conversational goals and shared knowledge between the participants in a conversation, we present a few more dialog framents between Bill and John, the two college students sharing an apartment.
In each example, as in conversations (I) and (2), Bill utters the same response, but its meaning is significantly different, depending on the context of the conversation. When we read Conversation Fragment (5), we infer that Bill may be going to ask his parents for money.
5) JOHN
How do we do this? We do not share knowledge with Bill to the effect that his parents have money or that Bill is willing to ask them for money.
The answer is based on a conversational rule:
RULE 5: The utterances in a conversation should be connected by continuity of topic, common conversational goals, and each participant addressing the intent of the utterances of the other participant.
Since the reader assumes that Rule (5) is true for Conversation Fragment (5), he concludes that there must be a connection between Bill needing money and the visit to his parents. The reader then infers the most likely connection:
Bill will ask his parents for money. John must also make this inference based on Rule (5), unless he knows that Bill regularly visits his parents to ask for money.
The significant point illustrated in example 5 is that the conversation focused the inference mechanism to find a connection between the respective utterances. Therefore, conversational principles can play an important role in focusing human reasoning processes.
The principle of focusing inference processes on significant or interesting aspects of conversational utterances and events is developed into a theory of human subjective understanding in Carbonell [1978] . of the rest of the conversation; their meaning is part of the context of the entire conversation.
Thus, it is easy to see why quoting only a short passage from a conversation (or a political speech) can give that passage has an entirely different meaning from what was originally intended.
The shared knowledge between two speakers depends on many different factors.
Two speakers share a large amount of basic knowledge by merely being members of the human race (e.g. the basic drives that motivate humans such as hunger, self-preservation, etc .). More knowledge is shared if the two speakers are members of the same culture.
(Much of the cultural and more basic human knowledge necessary to understand natural language is discussed in Schank and Ableson [1977] .) If the two participants hold the same type of job, are professional colleages, or have the same special interests, then they will share some rather specific knowledge. Two people with the same special interests (such as football or radio-astronomy) will usually steer the conversation to a discussion of their common interest s. RULE 6: The topic of a conversation may drift to a subject where the conversational participants share a great amount of knowledge.
Another factor that determines the knowledge shared by the participants in a conversation is their interpersonal relation, i.e., how well they know each other.
In conversational fragment (7) The utterance "I want a juicy hamburger" is interpreted differently in each dialog fragment. The difference in the interpretations is based on the different social relations existing between the two conversational participants. In Dialog (9) the utterance was interpreted to mean a direct order to the staff aide:
"Get me a hamburger and make sure it is julcyl" In Dialog (I0), the 7-year-old was expressing a request to his mother, hoping that his mother might comply.
In Dialog (II), the same statement was interpreted as nothing more than wishful thinking. The fir st inmate made no order or request to the second inmate.
Hence, the first utterance of each dialog fragment implies a different conversational goal depending upon the differences in the social relations of the conversational participants.
The social context and the relationship between the two speakers generate expectations that guide the course of the conversation.
A staff aide e~pects to be ordered about by a general. A mother expects her son to ask her for favors. Prison inmates cannot expect each other to do thinks that are made impossible by their incarceration.
These expectations lead to a formulation of different conversational goals for the utterance, "I want a juicy hamburger ," in each conversational fragment. The conversational principle exemplified in our discussion is summarized as Conversational Rules (7) and (8) The question was interpreted to mean four different things, depending on whom John spoke to. If a stranger asks, "Do you know how to get to X," the listener usually interprets this to mean "I want to go to X, but I do not know how to get there.
Please give me directions." Since the occupation of a cab driver is to take people to their destination it is perfectly legitimate for him to interpret the question as:
"If you know how to get to X please take me there." The person who is visibly lost and trying to find his way may interpret John's question as: "You seem to be lost.
Can I help you find your way?" Response (12.3) illustrates that the responder did not infer that John's goal was to go to Elm street, in contrast with the two previous responses.
A child often interprets questions of the form: "Do you know Y" literally, possibly inferring that the person asking the question is quizzing him. As in our previous examples, the differences in interpretation can be ~plained in terms of differences in the perceived goals of the participants in the conversation.
II) MICS: A process model of human conversation.
The phenomenon of human conversation is too comple~ for any single study to do justice to more than a narrow aspect of the problem.
In order to fully understand human conversations we may have to understand all human cognitive reasoning processes.
Our research approach can be outlined as follows:
I) Study many sample conversations; 2) try to establish some relatively general rules of conversation;
3) encode these rules into a process model; 4) see if this model accounts for certain aspects of human conversation; 5) realize that we solved hardly more than a minute part of the problem, and 6) reiterate the research process in a (hopefully positive) feed-back loop.
The conversational rules discussed in the first section address problems that need to be considered if one is to understand human conversations.
There is little doubt, as demonstrated by countless examples, that conversational goals, shared knowledge between speakers, social relationships between speakers ', and the conversational import of each utterance in a dialog are aspects of human discourse that need to be analyzed if one is to understand how human conversations work.
Analyzing these aspects, however, solves only a small subset of the larger problem of how conversations function. For instance, the problem of topic selection in a conversation needs to be addressed.
How does a person change the topic in a conversation?
How are new topics chosen?
These questions are analyzed in Schank [1977] .
Here we propose some additional ideas on the impact of shared knowledge and interests on topic-selection.
MICS (Mixed-Initiative Conversational System) is a fully implemented
computer program that generates one side of a natural-language conversation.
MICS embodies the conversational rules discussed in this paper, a topic transition mechanism based on Schank [1977] , and the idea of a conversational syntax. MICS illustrates that the conversational rules, topic transition rules and conversational syntax rules provide a sound, if possibly incomplete approach to the modeling of human conversation. MICS is able to generate reasonable conversations about domains on which it has some knowledge, but there are still many short-comings, as illustrated in the examples that follow.
MICS "knows" about itself as a person (e.g. it believes itself to be a computer programmer) and uses a model of the other conversational participant that contains certain information about the speaker, such as his social status, his occupation, his relationship with other people and his areas of special interest and more detailed knowledge.
The model of the other speaker is a necessary part of the conversational model, since it enables MICS to apply the conversational rules. When MICS talks to a stranger, it builds a model of the speaker; in fact~ one of its conversational goals is to learn about the person with whom it is conversing.
In the dialog that follows (an actual computer run), MICS starts out knowing nothing about Dave.
MICS CONVERSATION LOG ******** 10/11/77 ******* For instance, if Pete says, "I've got to go to Europe ," he probably wants to introduce his upcoming trip as a new topic of conversation. The knowledge that studying and talking cannot proceed simultaneuously is necessary in order to conclude that Pete wanted to end the conversation.
The primary usefulness of the MICS system is that it sheds light on problems about the rules of conversation that might otherwise remain unnoticed • The feedback from testing the implementation of our conversational model forces us
to be more precise and complete in our formulation of our ideas about conversation.
The following is a conversation fragment from a later version of MICS which has a more sophisticated inference capability for determining the knowledge that it shares with the other speaker. For instance, MICS infers that if a person voluntarily chooses to pursue a certain activity, then that person is aware of the intended consequences of this activity.
Ashtrays.
WHAT ABOUT ASHTRAYS? Figure (I) is a diagram of the control flow of MICS. As a process model of conversation, MICS is a useful tool, but it is far from a complete or even an entirely correct model of human conversation.
MICS is a 3 level production system.
The first set of productions is the conversational-syntax rules. These rules formulate contraints on the nature of the utterance that MICS will generate next in order to insure that the conversation follows a proper, "natural" course. Some of these constrains take the form of conversational goals used by the other two sets of productions rules. The second set of rules is the topic selection productions. These productions generate topic transitions guided by conversational goals and the amount of shared knowledge between the speakers • Several alternative things to say may be generated in this phase of the processing. These, as well as the conversational goals are stored in a short term memory (STM) and are used by the third, and theoretically most significant phase of the program: the topic evaluation rules.
The third set o f productions encodes the conversational rules discussed throughout this paper. These rules use the STM information, the memory models of the self and the other speaker, r and an inferencer when necessary. The purpose of these rules is to choose the most interesting topics (to both the self and the other speaker) from the alternatives generated by the second set of production rules. The inferencer is used to determine what the other speaker is likely to know and which aspect of the topic he would be most interested in discussing. Thus, the menaing of an utterance is produced by the third set o f production rules.
The utterances are generated in English by a rather crude phrasal English generator. The utterances from the other speaker are analyzed for their meaning and conversational form by a primitive, key-concept oriented analyzer.
Disclaimer: MICS is a first-pass process model of a theory of conversation, not a theory of learning about other people. As such, its ability to learn about the other conversational participants is not as general as the dialogs presented in this paper may suggest. MICS learns about the other speaker by instantiating a prototypical-person frame -a data structure that encodes the more generally applicable facts about people and their social relations. believe that the best way to analyze a problem as difficult as modeling human discourse is to forge ahead by creating rules that capture important aspects of the conversation problem. The usefulness of these rules should be tested in a reactive environment such as an interactive computer program. Since conversation is not a problem that can be isolated from other aspects of human cognitive behavior, we are researching it in conjunction with other aspects of Artificial Intelligence. A process-based theory o f haman conversation should give some insight into other Natural Language Processing issues in particular, and AI modeling of human reasoning processes in general.
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